Bubble, toil, and trouble by Ben Craig
■ John Law and the
Mississippi Company 
The history of the Mississippi bubble
centers around the rise and fall of John
Law, a gentleman who could be
described as one of the very first macro-
economists. In 1705, he published his
remarkable Treatise on Money, in which
he argued that issuing paper currency
should expand commerce, which, in
turn, would expand the demand for the
currency, so that prices would not rise. In
1710, Law came to France, after learn-
ing that his good friend, the Duc d’Or-
leans, had been made regent of France.
The French government was in financial
chaos. By the time Law arrived, the
crown had already had a partial default
on its bonds and was quite susceptible to
his suggestion that his ideas be put into
practice. 
In June of 1716, Law set up the Banque
Générale, a company whose sharehold-
ers included the crown, private investors,
and Law himself. It was like many banks
with an important exception. The paper
notes it issued on deposits of coins acted
as currency. The regent, influenced by
Law’s views on paper notes, made them
legal tender for taxes, required tax collec-
tors to exchange the notes for coins on
demand (thus giving the bank what
amounted to free branch offices), and
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Not everyone believes bubbles occur in
stock markets. Many economists do,
but others think something else is hap-
pening during periods of rapidly ris-
ing and plummeting stock prices. This
Commentary explains the two schools
of thought and shows how both can
describe a famous historical episode
known as the Mississippi bubble.
“I can calculate the motions of the
heavenly bodies but not the madness
of people.”
—Sir Isaac Newton, upon losing 
£20,000 in the South Sea Bubble
During the run-up in prices of Inter-
net stocks, financial commentators of
the time argued about whether the
higher prices were justified. Once prices
fell, the answer seemed all too obvious.
Investors had gotten carried away, had
not paid attention to the fundamental
determinants of value, had overesti-
mated the future return of the assets they
were buying. They had succumbed to
one of the most mortifying of all
investor pitfalls: a speculative “bubble.”
They should have known better! 
But could they have? When it comes to
explaining episodes like the dot-com
bust, most economists fall into two
schools. One school rejects bubbles as
an explanation and believes the price of
an asset always reflects the market’s
estimate of the asset’s value (except for
short-lived deviations); thus the prices of
Internet stocks truly reflected the mar-
ket’s estimate of the value of a new tech-
nology and the belief that it had opened
up new possibilities for profits. Other
economists would say that prices can be
driven higher when some market partici-
pants buy an asset in the hopes that the
price will continue to rise and they can
sell it before the price drops; they call
this scenario a bubble and say such was
the case with Internet stocks. 
The first school believes that the market
price may be temporarily displaced from
its long-run value, but arbitrageurs push
the price back to the level that can be
sustained. (Arbitrageurs make money by
buying or selling a stock that is not
priced at its long-run value and then
closing out their position for a profit
when the price returns to this value. 
Alternatively, the second school believes
that, at times, a few uninformed market
participants will induce behavior in the
informed participants that actually drives
the price away from its long-run value,
causing a short-run bubble, which then
bursts and causes the price to return to its
sustainable value.
The difference between the two schools
of thought lies not in whether a temporary
shock causes a market price to differ from
its long-run value (both schools acknowl-
edge this probability) or whether the 
market price eventually returns to this
value (both schools believe this occurs).
The difference depends on the assumed
behavior of the informed traders: One
theory asserts that informed traders
quickly push the price back to its long-run
value, the other says these same traders
will drive the price temporarily higher
than its long-run value. (Strictly speaking,
if a bubble is defined as a situation in
which the price of an asset is based on
something other than the market’s assess-
ment of its real value, the first school
would say bubbles are unlikely. We’ll
continue to refer to periods of rapid or
significant rise and subsequent fall in the
price of some asset as bubbles if they are
well-known as such.)
Which school is correct? This Commen-
tary explores both explanations in light
of an alleged archetypal bubble, the so-
called Mississippi bubble. This is the
first bubble for which we have reliable
price data, and it has been studied for
several centuries. (The tulip bubble may
be better known, but we have almost no
reliable price data for it.) Like the dot-
com bubble of recent time, it was the
result of a technical innovation, but in
this case, the innovation was one of a
new macroeconomic theory. encouraged the wealthy of France to
make large deposits of coins in the bank.
The Banque Générale followed the con-
servative policy of backing 50 percent of
the notes with government debt (so that
the fractional reserve was half the value
of the notes kept as coins), and the notes
circulated as currency at face value. The
operation was very profitable and earned
its investors a return of 64 percent per
year by the time the crown took it over in
December 1718.
In August of 1717 Law established the
Mississippi Company (officially regis-
tered as Compagnie d’Occident) in
which shares were purchased with a
combination of paper currency and
crown debt. The Mississippi Company
had monopoly rights to the fur trade of
the Louisiana and Canadian territories
and could essentially manage French
North America as its private fiefdom.
(New Orleans was named after the
regent, a large shareholder of the com-
pany.) The company exchanged shares
for long-term government debt, intending
to develop its North American holdings
with the long-term stream of cash pro-
vided by the interest payments on the
debt. Once the commercial possibilities
in North America provided a profit,
according to Law’s plan, the demand for
the currency issued by the Banque
Générale would be sustained. The acqui-
sitions of both rights and property that
were made by the Mississippi Company
soon included all of France’s properties
in Africa, East India, and China, and
monopoly rights to their markets. 
By October of 1719, Law’s company
had privatized most of the financial
functions of the crown: His company
had the sole right to coin money and the
right to collect all direct and indirect
taxes, and it held all of the government’s
debt. Holdings of government debt were
financed with successive share issues,
although the price of the later shares
was higher. These shares were entitled
to the same dividend as shares pur-
chased earlier at lower prices. However,
there was much that was confusing
about these shares. Some of the pur-
chases of the shares were made with the
Banque Générale’s currency, others
with government debt, and some seem
to have been options on possible future
purchases at a set price. It also remains
unclear what the crown owned and what
it owed to Law’s company. (The crown
was a large shareholder at the same time
that it was a heavy borrower through the
company’s holding of government debt).
What we do know is that initially, at
least, the public had enough confidence
in Law’s system to have faith in the
future payments on this debt.
At the height of Law’s career, in January
1720, he was made France’s comptroller
general and the superintendent general
of finance, in addition to being a large
shareholder in the Mississippi Company.
Within a month, the company also
owned the Banque Générale, whose cur-
rency was encouraged by a series of
edicts limiting the use of metallic money.
At the peak of share value, when shares
were heavily traded, the company was
worth about one-fifth of all the wealth 
of France. 
Several things are important to note
about the Mississippi Company and its
shares at this point. First, the company’s
assets, organizational structure, and
functions were poorly understood by
perhaps everyone at the time except Law.
Indeed, historians who have been study-
ing the company in light of modern
financial science have a difficult time
sorting out the structure of the company.
For example, it is still unclear whether
the Mississippi Company used the
Banque Générale’s assets for its own
purposes before the two companies were
formally merged in 1720. (Most histori-
ans now think that both companies were
both almost completely under Law’s
control). Second, in spite of the impres-
sive list of territorial holdings acquired
by the Mississippi Company, these were
not the assets that generated the most
excitement from investors. For example,
similar rights to the North American ter-
ritories had been given to other investors
with little or no profit to show for them.
What generated the excitement were
Law’s new ideas about money along
with the endorsement of these ideas by
the crown, which owned a share of the
company. And excitement there was.
Paris was swollen with investors from all
over Europe eager to buy shares in the
new company. The price of a share at its
height on the unofficial secondary mar-
ket in December 1719 was 40 times its
initial value. It was clear (at least to
some) that the revenues from the taxa-
tion rights could not possibly pay a 
5 percent dividend unless France grew at
a tremendous rate, and even then, that
dividend would not come for many
years. Further, the territories had been
only minimally developed and so could
not be expected to pay much soon.
Law chose to concentrate his business
operations on those functions that are
presently performed by government
institutions: taxation and the issuing of
currency, rather than, say, developing
colonial infrastructure. Perhaps
investors hoped that Law’s economic
system could generate such fabulous
profits in the short run that they would
allow the development of vast territories
in the long run. However, in May 1720,
prices of goods in terms of the com-
pany’s currency started rising rapidly.
This called into question Law’s theory
that currency would create the economic
conditions that would sustain its pur-
chasing power. 
Law tried to force a reduction in the
official price of shares from 9000 to
5000 livres. (The secondary market indi-
cated an even more precipitous fall in
the price of shares). There were riots,
and Law was fired. When it was clear
that no one else understood how his
company worked, he was brought back.
His attempts to maintain the value of the
currency by reducing the amount in cir-
culation unraveled, and the share price
fell rapidly. By December of the same
year, the share price was less than one-
tenth of its high value. The company’s
currency was no longer used in regular
transactions, and the crown confiscated
all shares that were held in the Banque
Générale. There was little value left in
the company, and Law fled the country.
■ The Mississippi Company
Might Have Been a 
“Bubble”…
Researchers who belong to the second
school described above (bubbles happen)
think that the rise and fall of the Missis-
sippi Company was indeed a good exam-
ple of a bubble.  They argue that bubbles
begin with a shock that causes the market
price of an asset to deviate from its sus-
tainable value. Such shocks are caused by
a few uninformed investors who trade
based upon poor models of market
behavior or on a short history of market
performance. The bubble then forms as a
result of the dynamics of the behavior of
the mostly well-informed traders (the
majority of the market). In this view, the
informed traders realize that the asset’s
price is above its value, but they differ
from each other in terms of when they
find out—some know early, others later.
They are also unaware of whether they
are early or late learners. Because no one
knows who’s early and who’s late,
informed traders gamble that they areearly learners and will be able to ride the
bubble up and get out earlier than the late
learners. Their problem has shifted from
one of making sure the price of an asset
equals its long-run value to one of opti-
mal timing: When should one buy to ride
a price rise up, and when is the best time
to get out of an overvalued asset? The
implication of this mechanism is that the
price of an asset rises above its long-run
value until enough “early leavers” sell
the asset so that its price drops by a cer-
tain value. At this point, all the specula-
tors realize that it is time to get out and
the price falls precipitously to its long-
run value.
The theory has much to recommend it as
an explanation for the Mississippi bub-
ble. It suggests that only a few unin-
formed traders are needed for the valua-
tion to be much less than the market price
at some time, and it even allows for many
of the informed traders getting burned by
the price fall when the bubble bursts.
Indeed, the proposed timing of the 
theory matches well with what we
know about the Mississippi bubble. By
May of 1719, 30,000 foreigners were in
Paris for the express purpose of trying
to subscribe to a share in the Compag-
nie d’Occident. In the same month, the
British ambassador reported many let-
ters from relatives and friends in Scot-
land, begging him to buy stock in the
company for them. There were reports
of people selling their homes in order to
buy a share. As the price rose, there is
evidence that many of the traders real-
ized that the price was not sustainable.
The French banker Martin wrote about
the trading, “When the rest of the world
are [sic] mad, we must imitate them in
some measure.” The question became
when to sell to avoid being caught. The
hope was, as Carswell, writing about
the South Sea bubble, an international
echo of the Mississippi bubble,
observed, “[to] sell out betimes and so
let the Devil take the hindmost.” Expe-
rienced financial traders could do very
well: The Langedoc bankers got out
early enough, as did the canton of
Berne, which made a profit of 10 times
its original outlay. The Dutch financial
community also did extremely well,
and Law might have ended very
wealthy had he not diversified his
shares into French land, which was con-
fiscated after the bubble burst. Thus, the
actors required for a bubble seemed to
be present, and the rapid rise and fall of
the price of shares also are consistent
with the bubble story.
Further, experimental studies of bubbles
match the Mississippi bubble in several
aspects. These studies suggest that bub-
bles are very likely to occur when more
of the market participants are new to
trading (as was true in the Mississippi
bubble), and match the spectacular price
rise and precipitous fall that were
observed in share prices of the Missis-
sippi Company.
■ On the Other Hand… 
However, the value placed on an under-
lying physical asset by well-informed
market participants can rise and fall
quite rapidly. What some describe as a
bubble may be nothing more than a
period in which an asset’s estimated
value rises and falls precipitously. For
example, oil might increase in price
because of an expected war. Buyers of
oil desire to buy more in order to store
in anticipation of possible shortages
during the war, and the price of the oil
rises. A peace is negotiated, and oil buy-
ers now realize that they are holding on
to an asset that is less valuable than it
would have been had a war stopped the
wells from flowing. People quickly
expect the price of oil to be lower, and
the price falls rapidly. Notice in this sce-
nario that speculation has been a benefi-
cial function of the market.  In no sense
is the rapid increase in price caused by
uninformed behavior, for the market’s
expectations are based on the real possi-
bility of future oil shortages. Uniformed
traders who might panic and send the
price of oil skyrocketing are not part of
this story. The dominating influence on
the market of well-informed traders is
enough to push the current price back to
a point that reflects the future shortage
of oil. 
Peter Garber, an economic historian,
believes that this is all that happened in
the Mississippi bubble.  He asserts that
in this and other so-called stock market
bubbles rapid price ascents and descents
occur because of corresponding reason-
able expectations about the true profit
prospects for the underlying property
right represented by the asset. It is the
rapid reaction to new information about
this underlying value that causes the
steep decline of prices.
There is also something attractive about
this “nonbubble” explanation of the
Mississippi bubble. Indeed, how does
one value the potential profits of the
assets of the Mississippi Company even
with the benefit of hindsight of almost
three centuries? The company owned
the economic potential of the entire
Louisiana Territory and Canada, as well
as the French possessions in Africa,
India, and China, although these hold-
ings do not seem to have been the
major driver of the price increase of the
shares. In addition to its world hold-
ings, the company had all of the debt
and the ability to issue currency and
collect taxes for the largest economy in
Europe. What was the true value of all
of these privileges? Even with the bene-
fit of modern economic science it is 
difficult to decide on a clear value for
the potential profits of these rights in
1720. In addition, a purchaser of a
share in the company had to evaluate
the potential of Law’s economic theory,
which seemed promising even to hard-
ened financial experts in London in
1719. Garber argues that the contempo-
rary market for the shares of Law’s
company could very well have been
evaluating this “new economy” with
the best means available, and the prices
could have reflected that value in a
rational price. However, the price was
volatile: It went up and it went down 
as the market’s assessment of the
underlying asset’s profitability changed.
■ Bubble? Hard to Tell
Even though the Mississippi bubble has
been studied for nearly two centuries,
economists still debate whether it was
even a bubble. Some say that the inexpe-
rience of a few investors in the market
led to speculative behavior that drove the
price much higher than most informed
investors would have valued it. Others
say the price of the shares rose and fell
as new information was evaluated about
the worth of Law’s theory. Both expla-
nations can be applied to other, more
recent episodes called bubbles, such as
the Internet bubble. Settling the debate is
made most difficult by the fact that we
know very little now about what reason-
able expectations of the “true valuation”
should have been, given only the infor-
mation available to the market traders
when they were trading. Just because the
price ultimately fell when more informa-
tion arrived does not mean that shares
had been valued unreasonably high.
Some researchers of the recent dot-
com episode point out that the price-to-
earnings ratios for stocks rose far above
their historic levels and then fell back to
these levels after the price fall, suggest-
ing traders had not been attending to the
right determinants of value. However,
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temporary deviation may have reflected a
new valuation paradigm that depended
less upon price-to-earnings ratios and
more on other factors. 
The debate continues to be unresolved
because it depends on a concept that is
unmeasured, given the present state of
economic science: the market’s assess-
ment of long-run value. The argument
centers around whether this assessment
is reflected in the price. A nonbeliever in
bubbles asserts that the price is the
assessment and delivers anecdotes to
suggest that the high price is not prepos-
terous. Either a new invention or a new
paradigm has made the notion of extra-
ordinary profits quite reasonable, justi-
fying a high price. A believer in bubbles,
on the other hand, uses anecdotes or 
historical measures of reasonable prices
to argue that most participants in the
market know that the high prices are not
sustainable. Until there is an ability to
measure the sustainable price that is
acceptable to both sides, the argument is
likely to remain unresolved.
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